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ESSAY
SAVIGNY, HOLMES, AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF POSSESSION
RichardA. Posner*

FRIEDRICH
Carl von Savigny (1779-1862) was one of the most
important figures in the history of legal thought, and throughout the nineteenth century enjoyed enormous international prestige. Today-in America at any rate-outside of a tiny subset of
legal historians, he is barely a name.' It seems to me that we lose
something when we forget our intellectual ancestors so thoroughly.
I shall try to demonstrate this by approaching Savigny from the direction of Oliver Wendell Holmes's book The Common Law,
which criticizes the influential theory of possession expounded in
Savigny's 1803 book Das Recht des Besitzes and in doing so paves
the way for a modern economic analysis of possession. I focus on
Savigny's theory of possession, rather than on any of the other
fields of law that he discussed, because it is the only part of Savigny's work that Holmes discusses other than in passing. The
disagreement between these two great legal thinkers over the law
of possession also brings into view the question of Savigny's
method, which is the contribution to legal thought for which he is
(or, more accurately, was) famous. For Savigny and Holmes had
not only, or even mainly, different theories of possession; they had
different conceptions of legal theory, of how to "do" law. Savigny
had a considerable influence on Holmes, though it was indirect.
But in Holmes's conception of legal theory we can glimpse some of
*Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. This is the lightly revised text of the Savigny
Memorial Lecture that I gave at Philips-Universitkit Marburg (Germany) on June 25,
1999. 1 am grateful to my host, Dean Erich Schanze of the law faculty of Marburg, for
encouragement and guidance in this project; to Susan Burgess and Ryan Hanley for
research assistance; and to Albert Alschuler, Neil Duxbury, Robert Ellickson,
Richard Epstein, Thomas Grey, Richard Helmholz, Frank Michelnan, Eric Posner,
Carol Rose, and Erich Schanze for many helpful comments on an earlier draft.
IAs of November 1999, the Social Sciences Citation Index recorded only 180
journal citations to Savigny since 1972, which is only about six a year.
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the early antecedents of the modem economic theory of law, a
theory that, I shall argue, provides greater insight into the law of
possession than either Savigny's or Holmes's theory of possession
could provide. So I shall be endeavoring in this paper to contribute
to the economic analysis of law as well as to the history of legal
thought.
I.
I said that Savigny's prestige in the nineteenth century was international and immense, and now I add that this was as true in the
Anglo-American legal world as it was elsewhere. The reason both
for his former celebrity and for his present obscurity has to do with
his "take" on law, which can be summarized in the following connected propositions and helps to explain Holmes's disagreements
with him:2
1. It is a mistake to try to codify a nation's laws; codification
stunts and distorts the growth of law. It is especially foolish to borrow another nation's code (and thus for a German state to borrow
the Code Napolgon).3
2. The authentic law of every nation, including the Germany of
Savigny's time (a cultural rather than a political entity) is the law
that has evolved from the nation's aboriginal "folk spirit" (Volksgeist) or "common consciousness of the people" (der allgemeine
Volksbewusstein) in much the same way that a nation's language is

2For helpful discussions in English of Savigny's approach to law, see John P.
Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 450-58 (1968); James Q. Whitman, The Legacy of
Roman Law in the German Romantic Era: Historical Vision and Legal Change
(1990); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a
Rat?, 143 U. Pa. L Rev. 1889, 2012-43 (1995); Susan Gaylord Gale, A Very German
Legal Science: Savigny and the Historical School, 18 Stan. J. Int'l L. 123 (1982);
Hermann Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical School of Law, 53 L.Q. Rev. 326
(1937); Edwin W. Patterson, Historical and Evolutionary Theories of Law, 51 Colum.
L. Rev. 681, 686-89 (1951); Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal
Science, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 837, 851-58 (1990); Symposium, Savigny in Modem
Comparative Perspective, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1989). For a brief biography, see
James E.G. De Montmorency, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, in Great Jurists of the
World 561 (Sir John Macdonell & Edward Manson eds., 1914).
3See Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and
Jurisprudence (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831) [hereinafter Savigny, Vocation of
Our Age].
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an organic development from ancient origins rather than the product of rational design, of a "code."4
3. To recover the authentic law, therefore, requires historical
study. The focus of study should be Roman law, for it is the common law (in the sense of the nonlegislated law) of Europe' and its
principles are thus the Ur law of Germany. The task of jurisprudence is to "get back" to those principles and discard later
accretions not necessitated by the practical needs of the present.
The later accretions are for the most part barnacles that retard the
efficacy and integrity of the principles.
4. Once the original Roman principles are grasped in their purity, the resolution of legal disputes should proceed by deduction
from the principles. Legal analysis properly is deductive ("formalist") rather than inductive, casuistic, social scientific, or political.
The Roman jurists of the creative period of Roman law were themselves casuists, but the principles that guided their work now have
to be extracted and made the foundation of a logical system of legal doctrine.6
The analogy of law to language is suggestive of formalism; language is a system of rules that you cannot get away with violating
by reference to social policies. Savigny himself, as I have noted,
pointed out the analogy of language to his conception of law.
5. The leading role in formulating the law should be played not
by legislators or judges, but by law professors.' They alone have the
See id. at ch. 2; 1 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System of the Modem Roman Law
12-17 (William Holloway trans., 1867) [hereinafter Savigny, Modem Roman Law]. A
computer language is an example of a language created by the application of rational
principles rather than organic evolution. Esperanto is an intermediate example.
Savigny's organicist conception of law has antecedents in Montesquieu and Burke, as
is argued in Peter Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea 57-59 (1980)
[hereinafter Stein, Legal Evolution].
-See Savigny, Modem Roman Law, supra note 4, at 3. Unless otherwise indicated,
however, I shall use the term "common law" to refer to the Anglo-American common
law.
6"The German Romanists [including Savigny] were not interested in tracing the
way in which Roman law had been adapted to serve the needs of contemporary
soiety .... [T]hey wanted to reveal the inherent theoretical structure that was
implicit in the [Roman] texts." Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History 119
(1999) [hereinafter Stein, Roman Law].
7 See Savigny, Modem Roman Law, supra note 4 at 36-40; Savigny, Vocation of
Our Age, supra note 3, at 149-51. Savigny was himself a law professor, first at
Marburg, where he wrote his treatise on possession (it was his doctoral thesis), and

HeinOnline -- 86 Va. L. Rev. 537 2000

538

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 86:535

time, training, and aptitudes necessary for the recovery of the law's
authentic principles and the adaptation of those principles to
modem needs. Universities are the supreme court of German
private law.
It is easy to see why these propositions would not resonate with
American lawyers and jurists either in the nineteenth century or
today, and so an initial question is why Savigny was highly regarded by American legal thinkers in the nineteenth century. Part
of the answer is no doubt the admiration that educated Americans
felt in that era for German universities, which were the best in the
world. Part is the nationalistic character of Savigny's conception of
law (a nationalism blurred, however, by the transnational character
of Roman law); the nineteenth century, especially its second half,
witnessed the rapid growth of nationalism in both countries. Part of
his appeal to American lawyers may have been that he academized
or "scientized" law,8 a move that, at a time when the academic
study of law in America was in a primitive state, was bound to be
welcomed by law professors and other legal intellectuals, regardless of the applicability of his specific methods and results to
American law. Savigny placed at the forefront of legal reform the
need to achieve an academic or theoretical understanding of law by
methods of historical research and (to a lesser extent) rational
analysis that are more congenial to law's theoreticians than to its
practitioners. He laid out an ambitious research program calculated to keep squads of professors busy for many years. When the
program was completed, and Roman law well understood, the historical school, as the approach of Savigny and his epigones came to
be known, faded. It no longer provided a research program, the
sine qua non of a successful school of academic thought.
Now that American universities have caught up with their European counterparts, and law has become a secure part of university
education and research, Savigny's significance in making law a rethen at Berlin, where, until the Revolution of 1848, he occupied high judicial and
other posts in the Prussian government while continuing as an academic. His political
conservatism led to his removal from his governmental posts when, in the wake of the
failed but frightening revolution, the Prussian king decided to give his government a
more liberal appearance. See De Montmorency, supra note 2, at 566-73, 585.
8This ground for admiration of Savigny is explicit in Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The
Development of Jurisprudence During the Past Century, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 271, 283
(1905).
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spectable academic subject-indeed, in remaking it into "legal science" (Rechtswissenschaft)-has lost its relevance to the concerns
of the American legal community. We are left with the five propositions that I listed earlier, none of which is especially relevant to
American concerns. Codification is a non-issue in modern American law. That law is too vast in extent and varied in content to be
brought under the rule of a single code or even a handful of like
codes. Codification has proceeded piecemeal-we have a federal
criminal code; federal rules of civil and criminal procedure and of
evidence; a Bankruptcy Code; a Uniform Commercial Code governing sales, negotiable instruments, secured transactions, and
other commercial subjects; and a number of other codes as well.
But there is no felt need to codify core common law subjects, such
as torts, contracts (though the Uniform Commercial Code codifies
a portion of this field), agency, and property (except intellectual
property). Savigny's opposition to codification has no present relevance even in Germany, which in defiance of Savigny's followers
adopted a comprehensive code in 1900 that jettisoned many of his
key ideas about possession.
As for the Volksgeist, such a concept can have little significance
for a nation such as the United States, a nation of immigrants from
many different countries. The nation's founders frayed the threads
that bound it to the Ur law, which was English, by revolting from
Great Britain, the "mother" country. In any event, for us the Ur
law was never Roman law. Britain began moving away from Roman law early in its post-Roman history.9 There are traces of
Roman law in American legal thought,"° not least in the law of
possession, but we have become oblivious to them; Roman law is a
subject virtually unstudied in American law schools. Savigny's project of recovering the legal principles that are authentically in tune
with the Volksgeist by studying the history of Roman law is incomprehensible to all but a tiny handful of modem American legal
9It has, however, been argued that "Roman law itself is closer to the common law
than is any modem codified system based on Roman law." Peter Stein, Roman Law
and English Jurisprudence Yesterday and Today, in The Character and Influence of
the Roman Civil Law: Historical Essays 151,165 (1988).
10See, e.g., Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary
America, in The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law: Historical Essays,
supra note 9, at 411.
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thinkers." This incomprehension, moreover, is part of a larger
"presentist" orientation, very much in the American grain, that
marginalizes historical inquiry as a method of assisting in the solution of current problems and in providing guidance for the future.
As for trying to deduce legal solutions from fundamental principles, most American lawyers and jurists deride that as "formalism."
We are casuists and often pragmatists, proceeding in the decision
of actual cases and in the formulation of our legal generalizations
from the bottom up rather than from the top down, that is, proceeding from the facts of specific disputes and from specific social
policies, often of a utilitarian cast, rather than from general principles whether historically or otherwise derived. Our legal system
remains a case law system, one administered by judges who place
much more weight on precedent and on their own intuitions of policy than on the treatises of law professors. Indeed, in recent years
law professors, especially at the most prestigious law schools, have
grown ever farther apart from the practical side of the profession.
The idea of appealing a judicial decision to a law school-an actual
practice in Savigny's time and place-is unthinkable in our system.
II.
A.
America's rejection of Savigny was announced in 1881 by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his book The Common Law, 2 the most
celebrated book in the history of American legal thought. Two of
the lectures that make up the book deal with possession. 3 They are
the two lectures in which Holmes discusses "German theories" of
law, and I do not believe that there is a sustained discussion of
German legal theory anywhere else in Holmes's oeuvre. The German theoretician whom Holmes discusses most in those lectures is
Savigny. It is a tribute to Savigny's international prestige that

n Among influential writers on American law at the present time, I can think only
of Richard Epstein as regularly harking back to Roman law for ideas. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty with
the Common Good 258-59 (1998).

2Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881).
See id. at 164-205,206-46 (Lecture V: "The Bailee at Common Law" and Lecture
VI: "Possession and Ownership").
13
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Holmes should have picked a book by him published seventy-eight
years earlier as the principal foil for a discussion of one of the most
important common law concepts, that of possession.
Holmes groups Savigny with other German thinkers (including
Kant and Hegel) as arguing that possession, in the eyes of the law,
requires that the person claiming possession intend to hold the
property in question as an owner rather than recognize the superior title of another person, so that in providing possessory
remedies to lessees, bailees, and others who lack such intentions,
modem law sacrifices principle to convenience. To this Holmes responds that he
cannot see what is left of a principle which avows itself inconsitent with convenience and the actual course of legislation. The
first call of a theory of law is that it should fit the facts. It must
explain the observed course of legislation. And as it is pretty
certain that men will make laws which seem to them convenient
without troubling themselves very much what principles are encountered by their legislation, a principle which defies
convenience is likely to wait some time before it finds itself
permanently realized. 4
And yet Holmes's Common Law could itself be thought-has in
fact been thought-a project much like Savigny's of "deriving fundamental principles to guide the present from a study of the past. ' ' u
One of Holmes's criticisms of the German theorists, signally including Savigny, is that they "have known no other system than the
Roman, ' 6. and he sets out to prove that the Anglo-American law of
possession derives not from Roman law, but rather from preRoman German law. Thus, just as Savigny and the other jurists of
the historical school use historical inquiry to excavate and refine
the principles of law, so Holmes uses historical inquiry to excavate
and refine the principles of law. The focus of the inquiry is different-Roman in Savigny's case, Germanic (ironically) in Holmes'sand the principles recovered by historical inquiry are also different,
as we are about to see. But these seem to be almost details.
14

Holmes, supra note 12, at 211; see also id. at 207, 218-19 (criticizing the German
theorists' views on possession).
isG. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 193
(1993).
11Holmes, supra note 12, at 168.
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Holmes's very challenge to the "universal authority" of Savigny's
theory of possession'7 could be thought a tacit endorsement of the
concept of the Volksgeist: A different Volk can be expected to have
a different Geist. This means that Holmes shared with Savigny a rejection of natural law; law cannot be excogitated from a universal
moral code. And the erudition of The Common Law marks it as a
contribution to Rechtswissenschafr; it is not a practitioner's handbook or treatise. 8 Savigny's influence on Henry Maine has been
noted,"9' and Maine's Ancient Law (1861) influenced Holmes.
Holmes had, therefore, a (characteristically unacknowledged) debt
to Savigny.'
B.
Still, the differences between the approaches of the two are
profound, as will now be shown. Although Savigny's treatise is
entitled "The Law of Possession," its actual subject, except for its
brief last book devoted mainly to ecclesiastical law, is the Roman
law of possession. Not until the treatise is one-third over is the
possibility of a discrepancy between Roman and modem law
acknowledged: If "a theory of Possession lays claims to be of any
use in practice, it must subjoin to the views of the Roman lawyers
those modifications under which the above views obtain practical
validity amongst us at the present day."21 But the modifications
discussed are relatively minor. This is remarkable. Savigny was
writing in the nineteenth century. Justinian had lived in the sixth
century, and most of the legal rules collected under his auspices
were much older. But Savigny believed that the principles of
ancient law were serviceable in modernity, and so his work was
largely completed when he discovered those principles.
Holmes was interested in the process of change itself, in how the
ancient principles had evolved into a greatly altered body of mod17Id. at 206.
18
Holmes was appointed a professor of the Harvard Law School on the strength of
The Common Law.
19See Stein, Legal Evolution, supra note 4, at 89-90.
21See White, supra note 15, at 149.
21Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Von Savigny's Treatise on Possession; or the Jus
Possessionis of the Civil Law 134 (Sir Erskine Perry trans., 6th ed. 1979) (1848)
[hereinafter Savigny, Treatise on Possession].
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em law. The motor of evolution was convenience or policy: "The
substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds,
so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but
its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work
out desired results, depend very much upon its past."' "The old
form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies
itself to fit the meaning which it has received."' Holmes was content with this process; he had no desire to return the law to an
earlier period of its development.
The difference between Savigny and Holmes with regard to history is obscured by the fact that the concept of possession existed
in something like its modem form in ancient law; it is not an artifact of modernity. It is undoubtedly the earliest form or precursor
of property, itself an ancient notion. The "problem" of possession,
the source of its enduring fascination as much to the Romans,
Savigny, and Holmes as to ourselves, is precisely its relation to
property. On the one hand, possession seems an incident of property, or ownership; on the other hand, nonowners frequently are
"in possession" of land or other things of value and owners are frequently out of possession. Moreover, the law in Roman times, as
today, granted remedies to possessors as well as to owners, and
sometimes to possessors against owners (as in the acquisition of title by prescription, that is, by passage of time) and to owners
against possessors. Possessory remedies were often simpler than
ownership remedies (this was as true of the Roman interdicts as of
the English action in ejectment, a formally possessory action used
commonly to prove title to real property; or trover, which is the
counterpart to ejectment for personal property), so even owners
might seek the former. Sorting out these relations was, and remains, a challenging intellectual exercise.
I am not a Roman lawyer and am not concerned with whether
Savigny got his Roman law of possession right. I am interested in
what his theory of possession was, how it differed in both content
and purpose from Holmes's theory, and why it differed as it did.
For Savigny, possession was the conjunction of two facts: physical power over a thing, and an intention to own it in the lay sense
"Holmes, supra note 12, at 1-2.
Id. at 5.
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of being able to use it, with no limitation of time, exclusively for
your own benefit (animus domini). If you had that power, and that
intention, you had possession. (And so a thief could obtain possession.) This ordinarily would entitle you to a remedy against anyone
who interfered with your possession unless he had a claim to possession that the law regarded as superior, which the owner might
(if the possessor was not the owner) or might not.
From this definition, much followed. Let me take the two elements of the definition, power and intention, separately. If you buy
goods that are in a locked warehouse, you do not obtain possession
in Savigny's sense until you get the keys. And if you wound a hare
but do not kill it, you do not obtain possession of it until you catch
it, since until then it might get away, and therefore until then it is
not within your physical power. You possess your domestic animals, because they're in your physical power. But you do not
possess wild animals until you trap or kill them unless the animal
has animus revertendi, that is, the habit of returning, which makes
him like a domestic animal (English common law makes the same
distinction): It's as if he were on a long leash.
The implication of the power component of Savigny's definition
is that possession, as distinct from use, which is often shared, can
never be joint. For if you can act with reference to a thing only with
the concurrence of someone else, it follows that you don't have
physical dominion. A further implication is that separate parts of a
whole cannot be separately possessed: the house and the soil it
rests on, the arm and head of a statue, a carriage and its wheel, two
stories of the same house. In the case of land, however, because it
is divisible without destroying an organic unity-boundaries are
arbitrary-Savigny is willing to allow co-ownership. To have a onethird interest in a parcel of land is enough like owning a smaller
parcel carved out from the larger one to be treated the same way,
since if the land were thus divided each owner would have exclusive control over his third. Likewise, buried treasure is severable
from the land above it because one could remove the treasure
without necessarily disturbing the land (the clearest case would be
if the treasure was found by a contractor whom the landowner had
hired to dig a well). They are not, or at least not quite, an organic
unity, like the parts of the statue. Living before the age of the
trailer park, Savigny evidently could not imagine moving a house.
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The notion of physical power as a condition of possession becomes problematic in the case of land, as we have already
glimpsed, and also when attention switches from the acquisition to
the maintenance of possession. One does not-take possession of
land in the same sense in which one might take possession of a wad
of cash, a carriage, or even a house, unless one fences the land,
which Savigny does not require as a condition of possession. All he
requires is presence on the land (conjoined, of course, with animus
domini). But because presence is an ambiguous sign of taking control, the would-be possessor must give notice of his possessory
intent (his "adverse possession," as we would say) if someone else
already possesses the land.
Once possession is obtained, the exertion of physical power that
was necessary to obtaining it in the first place will often cease. You
don't remain on your land all the time, and in fact you may have
leased it to someone else and so are never there. You leave your
carriage on the street, where it is out of your control. Savigny does
not treat these cases as cases of abandonment, which would deprive the owner of his possessory rights and remedies. But he
requires, for possession to continue, that "there must always be a
possibility of reproducingthe immediate condition which has been
described as the foundation of acquisition."'24 He makes an exception, as already noted, for land, where possession cannot be lost
until the existing possessor is notified that someone is seeking to
wrest possession from him. But if someone loses a good, which
Savigny calls a "movable" to distinguish it from land (we would call
it a "chattel"), he ceases to possess it; the finder obtains possession,
provided that he intends to keep it for his own use rather than return it to the owner or previous possessor.
This brings me to the second element of Savigny's definition of
possession-the requirement of animus domini. It too has important and sometimes startling implications. Two in particular require
note. The first is that a bailee, tenant, or other custodian or occupier
who has, as is usually the case of such holders, no intention of becoming the owner cannot be said to possess the thing held or
occupied. The second implication is that you cannot possess some-

24Savigny, Treatise on Possession, supra note 21, at 265.
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thing you don't realize you control, because then the animus domini
is missing.
The idea that a tenant does not possess the leased premises
seems especially odd. Savigny explains that the tenant can always
call on his landlord to defend the tenant's rights. But this seems
roundabout,' as well as inconsistent with Savigny's recognition that
a "hirer" (someone who has the use of a thing by virtue of a contract with the owner), a pledge creditor (a lender who holds the
borrower's property as a kind of hostage to assure repayment), and
a "fructuary" (someone who has a right to the fruits or other income of land or goods) all have a right of possession if the right is
granted to them by the owner. Such grants confer what Savigny
calls derivative possession. He regards such cases as anomalous because the derivative possessor lacks animus domini, but he is
willing to accept "an anomaly founded on practical grounds,"'
most clearly in the case of the pledge creditor: If the borrower
could dispossess the creditor, the purpose of the pledge would be
defeated. In the case of the hirer and the fructuary, Savigny argues
that the owner might have transferred his ownership to someone
who was not interested in coming to the rescue of the person in
possession. In that event, requiring that person-the hirer or fructuary-to appeal to the owner for help would be unavailing. So
these holders are given possessory remedies. But the point seems
equally applicable to the tenant.
Savigny is willing to allow practical need to trump elegantiajuris
or even fidelity to Roman legal principles. He acknowledges that
"merely theoretic considerations must give way to the actual wants
of daily life."' His emphasis on the acquisition of rights by prescription was apparently intended to foster the gradual extinction
of feudal rights; he was thus, in his own way, an agrarian reformer.'
2'Unless the tenant hasn't taken possession yet. Under the so-called "English" rule,
if when the lease begins the previous tenant remains in possession, the landlord has a
duty to oust him.
2
Savigny, Treatise on Possession, supra note 21, at 95; see also id. at 91.
21Id. at 404.
28 See Whitman, supra note 2, at 183-86; Stein, Roman Law, supra note 6, at 119-20.
The acquisition of rights by passage of time implies their possible extinction by
passage of time; when Savigny wrote Das Recht des Besitzes, many feudal obligations
had fallen into disuse, especially in the wake of the French incursions into Germany
that followed the French Revolution. See id. at 104-30.
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Emphasis on possession as the basis of property rights has itself antifeudal overtones, since the distinctively feudal rights (to services
and support) are nonpossessory. And because possession, especially
in Savigny's conception of it, is active, exertional, his emphasis on
possession could be taken as an implicit criticism of a rentier economy based on aristocracy and inherited wealth. But the theme of
social reform is a muted one in Savigny's treatise. He is reluctant to
allow fidelity to legal principle to be overridden by pragmatic considerations, for "even this latter practical interest [that is, the actual
by a procedure ...
wants of daily life] undoubtedly gains nothing
29

[that] renders all fixed principles uncertain."
There is more to Savigny's theory of possession. But this sketch
will suffice to indicate the main elements and to set the stage for a
comparison with Holmes.

C.
In turning to the .chapters on possession in The Common Law,
we may at first think the differences between Holmes and Savigny
largely technical, and wonder therefore at Holmes's hostility toward the German school. Holmes agrees with Savigny that
possession requires physical power over the object possessed (and
more power to gain than to continue in possession), conjoined with
a certain intent. Only, for Holmes, the requisite intent is merely the
intent to exclude others (except the owner, unless the owner has
transferred possession) from interfering with one's use. This explains the common law right of the bailee to obtain a possessory
remedy against someone who wrongfully deprives him of the
bailed good. Holmes discusses a case in which the plaintiff had entrusted a safe to the defendant to sell for him.3 The defendant
found some banknotes, evidently the plaintiff's, in a crevice in the
safe. The plaintiff demanded the money back. Holmes argues that
he was entitled to get it back; contrary to Savigny's view, the plaintiff had not abandoned the notes, even though, being unaware of
them (or at least of their presence in the safe), lie could not be said
to have animus domini with regard to them. In short, Holmes sev-

Treatise on Possession, supra note 21, at 404.
Holmes, supra note 12, at 225.

29Savigny,
30 See
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ers possession from ownership; the former, and the rights that go
with it, need have nothing to do with any claim of ownership.
There are other differences between Holmes's theory of possession on the one hand and that of Savigny and his followers on the
other--differences greater, incidentally, than the differences between the actual German and Anglo-American law of possession
in the nineteenth century and especially today.' Notably, Holmes
rejects Savigny's claim that the possibility of reproducing the
physical power used to obtain possession is a condition of retaining
it. Holmes gives the example of a person who has left a purse of
gold in his country house and is now a hundred miles away, in
prison, and "[t]he only person within twenty miles [of the house] is
a thoroughly equipped burglar at his front door, who has seen the
purse through a window, and who intends forthwith to enter and
take it."'32 Holmes thinks it weird to regard the owner of the purse
as losing possession to the burglar before the burglar actually takes
it. But he thinks this weird result is entailed by Savigny's theory
because the owner has lost the ability to reproduce the exercise of
physical power that got him the purse in the first place (Holmes assumes that he had found it), and the burglar has acquired the
ability to exercise exclusive control over it.
Holmes's definition of possession encounters anomalies, just like
Savigny's. For example, at common law, which is to Holmes as
Roman law is to Savigny-the body of principles that is to be reclaimed, clarified, purified, and expounded-an employee who
steals his employer's goods is a thief. That is, he is treated as having
taken the goods from the employer's possession, even though, under Holmes's definition of possession, the employee had possession
because he had physical dominion over them coupled with the intent to exclude all others from the use of them. (A similar example
that he discusses is that of a tavern customer who steals the plate
on which the food is served him.)33 Holmes considers this rule a
pure historical vestige, reflecting the fact that slaves, the historical
antecedents of employees, had no legal standing and so could not
be regarded as possessors.
",See James Gordley & Ugo Mattei, Protecting Possession, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 293
(1996).
"Holmes, supra note 12, at 237.
" See id.at 226-27.
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So far there is nothing to suggest a methodological cleavage between Savigny and Holmes. That cleavage is to be found not in
particular rules and outcomes, but in a difference in attitudes toward theory and history. Holmes does not take issue with Savigny's
or other German jurists' interpretations of Roman law. But he
does not believe that Roman law is the actual source of German
legal theory, and in particular of Savigny's theory of possession. He
thinks, rather, that the source is philosophy, particularly the philosophy of Kant and Hegel (though in fact Savigny was hostile to
Hegel's legal theory). According to that philosophy, Holmes tells
us, "[p]ossession is to be protected because a man by taking possession of an object has brought it within the sphere of his
will... [p]ossession is the objective realization of free will."'35 The
idea that animus domini is an element of possession-the idea that
principally distinguishes Holmes's theory of possession from Savigny's at the operational level-thus takes its origin, in Holmes's
view, not from Roman law (though Holmes thought it consistent
with that law) and not from convenience, policy, or "the actual
wants of daily life," but instead from German ethical philosophy.'
For Holmes, this was a tainted origin. He was a moral skeptic
who despised ethical philosophy and believed that a clear understanding of law required a clean separation between legal and
moral duty and between legal and moral terminology. He may
have misunderstood Savigny. The concept of the Volksgeist (which
does not appear in the treatise on possession, however) expresses a
historical rather than a rationalistic conception of law, and to that
extent should have been congenial to Holmes-who instead repeatedly denounces Savigny and his followers for their "universalist"
pretensions.' But the attitudes of the two men toward history are
indeed crucially different, almost opposite. Savigny's is reverential;
legal history has a "holier duty to perform" than merely "guard[ing]
our minds against the narrowing influence of the present," and that
is to keep up "a lively connection with the primitive state of the
people ... [T]he loss of this connection must take away from every
34The identification of Savigny with Kant rests on stronger grounds. See Ewald,
supra note 2, at 1933-35.
3Holmes, supra note 12, at 207.
law comes in to fortify principle with precedent." Id. at 209.
3"Roman
"See id. at 167-68,206.
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people the best part of its spiritual life."' Holmes's attitude toward
history, like Nietzsche's,39 is critical. For Savigny, the best legal
thinkers were the Roman jurists, and the task of modem law is to
recover the principles that animated Roman legal thought. For
Holmes, the best legal thought is modem, because only a modem
thinker can come to grips with modem problems. History provides
a repertoire of concepts and procedures that can be drawn upon to
deal with modem problems, and to that extent it is a resource and
a help. But it is also a drag because of the legal profession's methodological conservativism, which by positing a duty of continuity
with the past retards adaptation to the needs of the present.
Holmes's dismissal of the rule that an employee does not "possess"
goods that his employer entrusts to him as a historical vestige is
thus a characteristic move for Holmes.
If, moreover, as he emphasizes, "the proximate ground of law
must be empirical," that is, if "[f]aw, being a practical thing, must
found itself on actual forces,"' we can expect variations in legal
rules that cannot be referred to any general principle. Holmes illustrates using the different rules known to him for establishing the
possession of whales.4' Under one rule, if the first whaler to strike
the whale with his harpoon can't hold on, he has no right to the
whale if it is eventually killed by another; under another rule, he is
entitled to half the whale; and under another to the whole provided
that the point of the harpoon remains in the whale, even though
the line has been cut. Notice that the latter two rules are exceptions
to the common law principle, which is similar to the Roman law
principle expounded by Savigny, that to gain possession of a wild
animal you must actually capture it.
Although Holmes makes clear his belief that law should be
shaped to serve the practical needs of the present, he does not take
the next step, which is to evaluate particular rules and decisions by
that criterion. Like Savigny, Holmes focuses on the inner logic of
Savigny, Vocation of Our Age, supra note 3, at 136.

33

3'See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in
Untimely Meditations 57-123 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1983), discussed in Richard A.
Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and
Legal Scholarship, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573 (forthcoming Summer 2000).
4 Holmes, supra note 12, at 213.
41See id. at 212.
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the law of possession rather than on its conformity to social need.
The only explanation that he gives for his crucial move of rejecting
the requirement of animus domini in favor of requiring only an intent to exclude is that legal duties precede legal rights. The law of
possession creates a duty not to interfere with the possessor's exclusive use of the thing possessed; the duty gives rise to a corresponding
right to enjoin or otherwise prevent or 6btain redress for such interference; therefore the only intent the possessor has to have is the
intent to repel such interference.' But the "therefore" does not follow. There is nothing illogical about confining possessory remedies
to people who intend to retain possession against all the world,
whether or not it is sensible or consistent with Anglo-American
law.
What Holmes lacked was a social theory to take the place of the
kind of internal legal theory that he denigrated in the German
theorists. We now have that theory; it is called economics. It may
not be a complete social theory, even with respect to possession;
but it will carry us further than Holmes was able to go, and it will
provide an additional perspective from which to examine Savigny's
legacy to us.
III.
A.
It is highly desirable from an economic standpoint that valuable
resources should be made subject to a right of exclusive use, control, and benefit in someone. Without such a right, incentives to
invest in the production of valuable goods will be suboptimal-for
example, the owner of farmland will have no assurance that he will
be able to reap where he has sown.4' Some resources, moreover,
will be overused-for example, a pasture owned in common: None
of the owners of the cattle pastured on it will consider the cost that
their use imposes on each other by reducing the amount of forage.
In short, efficiency requires property rights.4
42See

id. at 219-20.

,3This is not a modem insight; it was well known to Hobbes, Blackstone, and many
others.

"See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 36-37 (5th ed. 1998). On the
economics of possession generally, see Richard A. Epstein, Possession, in 3 The New
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One can imagine two polar systems of property rights: ownership
only in accordance with a system of paper titles, and ownership only
by physical possession. Each, however, would involve serious inefficiencies. A universal system of paper titles assumes that everything
is already owned,5 and permits transfers only by formal conveyance
(for example, the delivery of a deed). It is helpless to deal with
problems of acquisition of property that is unowned, whether because abandoned or never owned. It also leaves undefined the
status of non-owners who nevertheless have the exclusive use of
property, such as tenants, and is helpless to deal with the inevitable
mistakes to which a system of paper rights gives rise. The other polar regime, in which rights to the exclusive use of property are
made to depend on physical control of the property, entails heavy
investments in the maintenance of such control. It also makes no
provision for rights to future, as distinct from present, use. An example is the appropriation system of water rights that is in force in
the western states of the United States, under which one acquires a
right to water by possessing-that is-using, water (in irrigation,
for example). This system encourages wasteful present use as a
method of staking a claim to the future use of the water. The future
use may be sufficiently valuable to make the present wasteful expenditure worthwhile from the possessor's standpoint, even though
a system of paper rights to future use would be more efficient from
an overall social standpoint.
This discussion suggests that an efficient legal regime of property
rights is likely to be a mixed system, one that combines paper rights
with possessory rights. The task of economic analysis becomes that
of identifying the efficient combination and comparing it with the
combination actually found in the legal system.
B.
We can begin with the question whether unowned property
should be obtainable only by possession, or also by grant or other
nonpossessory method. The general answer is, only by possession.
This can be seen best with the aid of an example. Suppose a new
and, to simplify analysis, uninhabited continent were discovered.
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 62 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also
Dean Lueck, First Possession, in 2 id. at 132.
45

An exception-the acquisition of title by a grant-is discussed below.
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Would it be efficient to give the discoverer title to the entire continent before he had taken possession of it, in the sense of occupying
all or at least most of it? Probably not. Such an enormous reward
would incite an excessive investment in exploration. The explorer
who discovered the continent just one day before his rivals would
obtain the continent's entire value. The prospect of obtaining this
value so greatly in excess of the value of his actual contribution to
its creation would induce him, and likewise his rivals, to invest
more than the social value of the investment in the quest.' An even
more extreme case, one that was common in the early period of
European explorations of other continents, was the effort by monarchs (including the Pope) to create property rights in undiscovered
lands by grant.
The efficient alternative to basing ownership of previously
unowned property on either discovery or a grant is to base it on
possession in the sense of physical occupation somehow defined.'
This approach has two advantages. First, it reduces the net reward
for being first, and so alleviates the problem of excessive investment by forcing the would-be owner to incur costs of occupation.
Second, it tends to allocate resources to those persons best able to
use them productively, for they are the people most likely to be
willing to incur the costs involved in possession. Thus, imposing
possession costs on a would-be owner not only reduces the amount
of resources devoted to becoming an owner by reducing the ieward
4Suppose
that the prize (the exclusive right to exploit the newly discovered
continent) is worth $X, and that if there were only one potential discoverer he would
spend $.IX to discover it and this would take him T years. But there are 10 potential
discoverers, and if they have an equal chance of being the first discoverer each will
(assuming they are not risk averse) spend up to $.IX in the race to be first. The
aggregate expenditure will be ten times what the single potential discoverer would
spend. Suppose that as a result of the race, the continent would be discovered a year
earlier, given the time value of money, this would increase the value of the discovery,
say to $1.1X, but the increase ($.IX) would fall far short of the added cost ($.9X). The
race would thus be wasteful from a social standpoint. Lueck points out, however, that
there may be no race if one of the contestants has much lower costs than the others,
so that it is apparent from the start that if there is a contest (and the contestants have
equal access to the capital markets to finance the expense of the contest) he will win.
See Lueck, supra note 44, at 134. In that event, the others will forbear to compete.
47For an analogy to trademark law, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 281-82 (1987). The
economic principles of possession have many applications to intellectual property, but
I shall not discuss them in this Essay.
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of ownership (the first point); it also acts as a screen to exclude aspirants who are unlikely to derive value from ownership. By doing
this it reduces the transaction costs of a pure paper-title system. If
the discoverer could obtain title to the entire continent just by declaration or filing, he would turn around and sell off most or all of
the land, because he would surely not be the most efficient developer of all of it. It is more efficient to give the people who are
actually going to possess the land the ownership right in the first
place.
In short, conditioning ownership on possession can, in the case
of newly found property, reduce both wasteful competition and
transaction costs. It is a crude and costly method of optimization,
but in a variety of historical circumstances may be the best available. Consider the whale cases discussed by Holmes. If the right to
the whale went to the first whaler to stick his harpoon into the
whale even if the harpoon quickly fell out (or the line broke) without slowing down the whale, we might find the ocean blanketed
with amateurs good at flinging harpoons but not good at actually
killing whales. This would be an example of a socially wasteful race
to be the first "discoverer" of valuable property. But if instead the
law gives the property right in the whale to the whaler who kills it,
this may discourage cooperative activity that is essential to efficient
whaling, as it is not to most hunting, where the rule that ownership
can be obtained only by possession prevails.
The second rule discussed by Holmes, the "half a whale" solution,
can be understood as a response to the problem of discouraging cooperation. Although it is a step away from a pure system of
possessory rights in the direction of a claims or prospect system,' it
is remote from a system in which exclusive rights to whales (or to a
newly discovered continent, to which a newly sighted whale is economically analogous) are created by granting those rights to the
first person to discover the commercial value of whaling. It illustrates the point that an optimal regime of property rights is likely
to combine possessory and nonpossessory rights.

'sFor a much richer discussion of nineteenth-century whaling norms from an
economic standpoint, see Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors
Settle Disputes 196-206 (1991).
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C.
The issue of possessory fights is further illustrated by Holmes's
case of the safe with the hidden banknotes in it. Under AngloAmerican common law, the agent holding the safe for its owner
does not acquire possession of the notes; under Roman law, according to Savigny, he does. Considered from the standpoint of
economics, the bringing to light of lost property is a valuable service and should be encouraged. But as with the discovery of new
continents, giving the discoverer of lost property its entire value
could very well lead to an overinvestment in exploration. A further
problem, which has no counterpart in the case of continental discovery, is that giving the discoverer of lost property its entire value
may make owners overinvest in safeguarding their property. It
seems that what is needed is not a shift of ownership to the finder,
but a finder's reward, the domain of the law of restitution." An inferior solution would be to divide the found property between the
original owner and the finder. For if the division would reduce the
total value of the property (not a problem with banknotes, however), the parties would expend resources on negotiating a transfer
of one party's share to the other or both parties' shares to a third

party.
In the case of the safe, I have been assuming that the owner
owned the banknotes. Suppose he didn't. Consider a clearer example: Someone leaves his wallet, containing money, at a supermarket
checkout counter. A customer picks up the wallet. The owner never
claims it. Should the customer be entitled to retain possession of the
wallet and money, or the supermarket (the "locus in quo," as the
cases say)? The argument for the customer is that since it was he
who found it, he deserves a reward; the supermarket did nothing.
But if, knowing that he will be able to keep the wallet if the owner
49See Nadalin v. Automobile Recovery Bureau, 169 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 1999), and
cases cited there; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 . Legal
Stud. 83 (1978); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65 (1985).
Holmes also discusses a case similar to the case of the safe where "a stick of timber
comes ashore on a man's land" (presumably without his knowing it). "[He thereby
acquires a 'right of possession' as against an actual finder who enters for the purpose
of removing it." Holmes, supra note 12, at 223 (footnote omitted). The optimal
solution may be to give the finder a reward while giving the property right to the
landowner-assuming the stick of timber was unowned when it washed ashore.
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doesn't claim it, the customer walks off with it, it is less likely to be
returned to the owner than if the wallet had been left to be found
by a supermarket employee. For when the owner of the wallet discovers its loss, he will check in the places that he has been that day,
and the search will quickly lead him back to the supermarket.
It is on this basis, which owes nothing to the analysis of the legal
concept of possession, that American law has traditionally distinguished between lost and mislaid items, "lost" meaning that the
owner doesn't realize the property is missing. Not realizing that it
is missing, he is unlikely to search for it, and so the law awards lawful possession of lost property to the finder rather than, as in the
case of mislaid property, to the owner of the place where it is
found. The distinction is fragile and much criticized.' Why couldn't
the finder of the mislaid item be given possession on condition that
he leave his name and address with the supermarket so that the
owner can track him down? But the point I want to stress is simply
that the concept of possession does not drive the analysis when an
economic view of the issue is taken. Instead, the choice of whom to
give possession to is determined by asking which allocation of possessory rights will be more efficient.
I have not finished with the supermarket example. For there is
another objection to allowing the customer-finder to keep either
lost or mislaid property that is not claimed. His reward may be excessive in the sense that it might be much greater than the cost to
him, and we have seen that excessive rewards for finding tend to
attract excessive resources into the activities that generate such rewards. True, it is only ex post that the customer-finder obtains this
reward, that is, it is only if the owner did not claim his property;
and this means that the finder's expected reward may have been
small, since most people who lose valuable property make an effort
to recover it. But since an employee of the supermarket would
probably have found the wallet shortly after the customer did, the
value of the customer's finding it may have been slight-in fact
negative, for the owner will have more difficulty reclaiming it from
a customer than from the supermarket even if the customer is required to leave his name and address with the supermarket.

50

See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 Fordham

L. Rev. 313,316-21 (1983).
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Suppose the rule is, therefore, that the supermarket has lawful
possession, but the customer-finder doesn't know or doesn't care
what the law is and walks off with the wallet-and then he forgets
it in the next supermarket he goes into. This time an employee of
the supermarket finds it, and the customer returns to the supermarket and claims it. Should he, the wrongful possessor, prevail
over the subsequent lawful finder, the supermarket?" Presumably
not; depriving him of possession is the only feasible sanction for his
initial wrongful act, and the prospect of such deprivation may be
the only feasible deterrent against wrongful takings.
D.
The case of the safe casts light on the important question of
whether physical control, either complete or in the attenuated form
specified by Savigny (the power merely to reproduce that control),
should be required for the maintenance as well as acquisition of
possession. The answer given by economics is, in general, no. Such
a requirement would lead to wasteful expenditures and also discourage specialization. Imagine that a tenant were deemed the
owner of the leased premises because the landlord, by virtue of the
lease, loses physical control over them (that is, the landlord cannot
barge into the premises during the term of the lease). Savigny gets
around this problem by denying that the tenant is ever in possession. But this leads to the awkward and costly result that the tenant
can protect his undoubted possessory interests only by enlisting the
aid of the landlord, even though the latter may be indifferent to the
protection of the tenant's possessory interests. The landlord might
not care, for example, whether the tenant was dispossessed, however wrongfully, by a creditor who promised to continue paying the
rent. The tenant would have to sue the landlord for the cost of being dispossessed, and the landlord presumably would then turn
around and sue the creditor as the primary wrongdoer-a circuitous method of dealing with wrongful dispossession.
It would be more sensible, though heretical in Savigny's system,
to recognize the joint possession of landlord and tenant and to parcel out the right to take legal action to protect their possessory
See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 100-103 (4th ed. 1998).
-,
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interest between them in accordance with comparative advantage
in particular circumstances. I mentioned the case where the tenant
has not yet taken possession. To this can be added cases in which
dispossession by an intruder takes place late in the term, and the
tenant lacks adequate incentive to sue; cases in which the infringement is more harmful to the landlord than to the tenant (for
example if the tenant is dispossessed by a dealer in illegal drugs,
who proceeds to frighten away the other tenants); and cases in
which the tenant simply lacks the resources to litigate against the
infringer.
Savigny recognizes the problematic character of requiring exertion in order to maintain a possessory right, by requiring notice as a
precondition to dispossessing a landowner. Suppose a tract of land
was previously unowned, unclaimed, and unoccupied, and there is
no paper title to it. The first possessor is therefore the owner. But
suppose that he is not continuously present on the land. If someone
now occupies the land, is he the possessor? Savigny's answer, which
is no, is surely correct; a contrary answer would lead to wasteful
expenditures by owners on fencing and patrolling land. It is one
thing to condition acquisition of title to newly found property on
possession, as I argued earlier; but once title is acquired by this
route, it should be enough for the maintenance of that title to record it in a public registry of deeds in order to warn away
accidental trespassers. That is a cheaper method of notice than
elaborate signage and fencing, let alone the kind of present, pervasive use that might reasonably be required to obtain title to terra
incognita.It is another example of why a system of purely possessory property rights would be uneconomical.
But records are not infallible; nor do they ordinarily record
abandonment. If a new occupier of land formally owned by another makes clear to that owner that he is claiming the land, and
the owner does nothing to contest the claim for years, the law shifts
the ownership of the land to the new occupier, who is said to have
acquired ownership by "adverse possession." The requirement of
adverseness is essential. Otherwise a tenant whose lease extended
for the period of years required to obtain ownership by prescription (that is, by passage of time) would, at the end of that period,
have become the owner of the leased property.

HeinOnline -- 86 Va. L. Rev. 558 2000

2000]

Law and Economics of Possession

559

The tenant's possession is not "owner-like;" the adverse possessor's is. The root difference is in the possessor's intent, which can
often be gathered from such "objective" indicia as the existence of
a lease, the behavior of the owner (whether itself "owner-like"),
and the behavior of the possessor (for example, whether he makes
permanent improvements to the property, implying that he thinks
of himself as the owner). Savigny was right, it turns out, to relate
possessory rights to "ownerly" intentions, but wrong to suppose
that such intentions should be required always to be present for a
possessory right to be recognized.
The economic rationale of adverse possession, conceived as a
method of shifting ownership without benefit of negotiation or a
paper transfer, can be made perspicuous by asking when property
should be deemed abandoned, that is, returned to the common
pool of unowned resources and so made available for appropriation through seizure by someone else. The economist's answer is
that this should happen when it's likely to promote the efficient use
of valuable resources. It is undesirable in general that property
should remain in the common pool, for the reasons explained at
the outset of my discussion of the economics of possession. Thus
the clearest case of abandonment is when a possessor deliberately
"throws away" the property, in effect voluntarily returning it to the
common pool. His act signifies that the property has no value in his
hands, and so by deeming the property abandoned and therefore
available for reappropriation by someone else, the law encourages
the reallocation of the property to a higher-valued use. Similarly,
the owner who does not react to the adverse possession of his
property for years is indicating that he does not value the property
significantly, which is the practical economic meaning of abandonment. A slightly less clear case of abandonment, which I have
already discussed, is where the owner loses the property and makes
no effort to reclaim it, or gives up on reclaiming it; but that is an
unlikely occurrence with land.
Why, though, not require the adverse possessor to negotiate with
the owner over a transfer of title? The answer is obvious when the
owner actually throws away his property; his act indicates that he
values the property at zero dollars or less, and so any finder who
bothers to take the property is certain to be someone who values it
more. In such a case, negotiation is not required to certify that the
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appropriation of the property by the finder is indeed a valuemaximizing transaction, and so the costs of negotiation would be a
deadweight social cost, a waste. But adverse possession is almost
always of land, and land, as I have said, is rarely thrown away, lost,
or mislaid. When transaction costs are low, market transactions are
a more efficient method of moving property to its socially most
valuable uses than coerced transactions are. But transaction costs
can be high even when one is dealing with parcels of land. The
owner may be unknown. More commonly, the exact boundaries of
his property are unknown, so that the adverse possessor doesn't
know that he's encroaching or the owner that his property is being
encroached upon. By the time the owner wakes up and asserts his
rights, evidence may have faded and the adverse possessor may
have relied on a reasonable belief that he is the true owner, creating a bilateral monopoly situation. The adverse possessor, thinking
the property his, may have made an investment that will be worthless if he loses the property to the original owner, to whom,
however, the property may also be worthless, as indicated by his
having "slept" on his rights. When there is a gross disparity in the
value that the only competitors for a good attach to it, transaction
costs are likely to be high as each competitor vies for the largest
possible share of that value.' Adverse possession is a method of
correcting paper titles in settings in which market transaction costs
are high;53 it improves rather than challenges the system of prop-

erty rights.
Savigny makes the interesting suggestion that an intention to
abandon property can sometimes be inferred from negligence in
the use of it.' It would be more straightforward to say that the neglectful possessor both implies by his conduct that the property is
not worth much to him and creates the impression among potential
finders that the property has indeed been abandoned and is therefore fair game. Deeming the property abandoned in these
Suppose the land is worth $1 million to the adverse possessor (perhaps because he
is aware of mineral deposits on it) and only $10,000 to the original owner. Then at any
price between $10,000 and $1 million both parties will be made better off by a sale.
But each will be eager to engross as much of the difference as possible, and that may
make it difficult for them to agree on a price without lengthy and costly bargaining.
5 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession,
79 N.w. U. L. Rev. 1122 (1984).
mSee Savigny, Treatise on Possession, supra note 21, at 270-71.
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circumstances becomes a method of reducing transaction costs and
increasing the likelihood that the property will be shifted to a more
valuable use.
Economics further implies that the right of adverse possession
should be confined to cases in which the adverse possessor is acting
in good faith-that is, he really believes the property is his. Otherwise the doctrine would encourage coercive property transfers in
settings of low transaction costs. Confined to cases in which the
true owner cannot easily be identified or found or seems clearly to
have abandoned the property, the doctrine fufills a traditional
function of law conceived economically, that of mimicking the
market in cases in which high transaction costs either prevent the
market from bringing about an efficient allocation of resources or,
as in the case of abandonment, becoming a pure waste.
We should be able to see by now the close relation between (as
well as the interdependence of) possession and paper titles as
methods of establishing property rights, and also the historical priority of the former. Possession, just like a deed of title recorded in
a public registry, is, provided it is "open and notorious," as the
cases on adverse possession say, a way of notifying the world of the
existence of a claim.' It is likely to be the only feasible way in the
earliest stages of society. The fence is prior to the paper title as a
method of announcing a property right. Once understood as being
concerned with notice, the question of requiring an exercise of
physical power, whether to obtain or maintain a possessory right,
can be seen to involve a tradeoff between the costs of particular
physical acts that communicate a claim and the benefits of clear
communication. The more elaborate the required acts, the more
unmistakable the communication, and this is good because the
clear public definition of property rights lowers transaction costs
and tends to optimize investment; but also the more costly this
form of notice becomes. The costs of the most elaborate acts of notice by possession-acts of complete, continuous, and conspicuous
occupation-will often outweigh the benefits. That is why a lesser
degree of active possession will suffice to maintain a property right
than would be necessary to acquire it.
5This function of possession is emphasized in Carol M. Rose, Possession as the
Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985).
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Consider the colorful old case of Haslem v. Lockwood.m The
plaintiff had raked horse manure dropped on the public streets into
heaps that he intended to cart away the next day, that being the
earliest he could procure the necessary transportation. Before he
could haul them away, the defendant came by and hauled them off
in his cart, and the plaintiff sued for the return of the manure. He
won. This is the economically correct result. The original owners of
the manure, who were the owners of the horses that had dropped
it, had abandoned the manure; the plaintiff had found it. He took
possession of it by raking it into heaps, and the heaps were adequate notice to third parties, such as the defendant, that the
manure was (no longer) abandoned. To have required the plaintiff,
in order to protect his property right, to go beyond the heaping of
the manure-to fence it, or watch continuously over it, or arrange
in advance to have a cart in place to remove the manure as soon as
it was heaped-would have increased the cost of the "transaction"
by which manure worthless to the original owner became a valuable commodity, without generating offsetting benefits.
E.
When property is stolen, it is not deemed abandoned, and so the
purchaser from the thief, even if wholly and reasonably ignorant of
the tainted source of his possession, has no right against the original owner. This rule can be defended as reducing the gain from,
and hence the likely incidence of, theft; but there is more to a
sound economic analysis, as is brought out by the currently muchdiscussed issue of property rights in stolen arty Many works of art
were stolen more than half a century ago during World War II. It
can be argued that if the original owner has done nothing to try to
recover the work in all that time, his title should be cut off, lest the
current owner be reluctant to exhibit the work for fear of alerting
his dormific predecessor; the work should be deemed "abandoned." If this were the rule, original owners would have an
incentive to take additional precautions to prevent the theft of
37 Conn. 500 (1871).
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes
Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles, in Economics of the
Arts: Selected Essays 177 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & Pierre-Michel Menger eds., 1996).
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their art. But creating such an incentive is not the unalloyed benefit
that it may seem. The cost of these precautions, precautions that
might include refusing to allow the art to be exhibited widely, must
be balanced against the cost of additional efforts by the purchaser
to prevent the discovery of the art, as well as the additional search
costs that an original owner will incur to discover his stolen art if he
is entitled to get it back even from a bona fide purchaser from the
thief. If the costs in concealment by the purchaser and search by
the owner, under a system in which the original owner prevails, do
not greatly exceed the costs in owner precaution under a system in
which the bona fide purchaser prevails, the undesirability of making stolen goods more readily marketable is likely to tip the
balance against allowing the purchaser to acquire title.
The problem is general, and harks back to the problem of safes
and wallets. If we make it too easy for finders to acquire title by
possession of lost or mislaid goods, we incite owners to take additional precautions to prevent their goods from being lost or
mislaid. These precautions involve real costs. We need rules that
will economize on them. Perhaps in the case of lost works of art, or
other lost property of considerable value, the optimal solution (resembling the "half a whale" rule) is to restore the work to the
original owner but to entitle the finder to a reward large enough to
encourage the search for lost art, though not so large as to make
owners excessively cautious about risking the loss of their property.
Holmes thought it anomalous, we recall, that an employee
should not be deemed to possess property that his employer had
entrusted to him. But the rule makes economic sense. The entrustment (like that of the dinner plate to the tavern guest) is
narrowly circumscribed, with little room left for the exercise of discretion by the "custodian." So if the terms of the entrustment are
deliberately violated, the inference of deliberate wrongdoing deserving severe punishment is easily drawn. There is no economic
difference between the tavern guest who steals the plate and a person who enters the tavern and steals the plate without asking to be
served and thus becoming a customer, or between the Brinks
driver who makes off with his employer's cash-laden armored car
and the stranger who put him up to the crime.
Savigny is right to worry about joint possession, though not because it is inconsistent with the definition of possession. Transaction
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costs are greater if the law, rather than vesting the right to the use of
property in one person, requires two or more people to agree with
each other on how the property is to be used. The common law deals
with this problem by allowing each joint possessor to insist on the
partition of the jointly possessed property, so that the property becomes reconfigured as separate parcels, each controlled by only
one person. Of course this won't be permitted if the partition
would destroy the value of the property, as in Savigny's case of the
statue's arm and head being separately owned. In such cases, efficiency requires a presumption that the whole object is the thing
possessed.
I do not want to write a treatise on possession, so I will break off
here my discussion of the economics of the law of possession. I
have tried to show that while Holmes was right, or at least modem,
to ask the law of possession to justify itself in terms of current social need, he couldn't do much with this important insight because
he lacked the requisite social theory, which economics has now
supplied.
IV.
In describing legal thinking about possession as passing through
three stages in the last two centuries, the first represented by the
legal theory of Savigny, the second by the legal theory of Holmes,
and the third by economic theory, I may seem to be suggesting that
Savigny missed the boat, that he was doubly in error in failing to
use the functionalist approach of Holmes or the economic approach that has now operationalized it. That is not my intention. It
is a mistake to suppose that every modem insight or approach was
always available, so that the fact that it was not discovered or applied until recently is to be ascribed to the stupidity of our
ancestors compared to ourselves. Different epochs have different
needs. We risk committing the fallacy of anachronism when we
criticize our predecessors for not looking at the world the way we
do. Savigny, remember, was aware of the importance of the "actual
needs of daily life" in shaping law. But the actual need of daily life
that he emphasized, appropriately for his time and place, was for
clear and uniform legal rules. Germany in 1803 was divided into
hundreds of independent states and its legal institutions were too
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weak and fragmented to bring clarity and uniformity to the law. 8
Especially in the western part of Germany (Where Marburg, the
site of the composition of Savigny's treatise on possession, is located), the French Revolution and its aftermath had unsettled,
even disoriented, German thought. Savigny, as we know from his
later criticisms of codification, did not think that Germany's legal
culture was ready for the Benthamite project of starting from
scratch with a clear and concise codification of functionally derived
legal rules and principles. The alternative was to use the universities' intellectual resources to extract from Roman law-a highly
sophisticated body of law-a set of clear principles to be the common law of Germany.
It is often said of particular issues in law that it is more important that the law be settled than that it be right. This is an
aphoristic version of the argument for rules as distinct from standards. Rules abstract a few relevant facts from the welter of
circumstances of each actual case and make the selected facts legally determinative. The consequence is an imperfect fit between
rule and circumstances, resulting in some outcomes that are erroneous from the standpoint of the substantive principle undergirding
the rule. This is a cost, but it must be traded off against the benefit of
the rule in reducing legal uncertainty and the cost of litigation. Uncertainty is costly in itself and also may invite judicial corruption,
whether financial or political, by making it difficult for outsiders to
determine whether a judicial decision is in accordance with law. If it
is especially urgent at a particular stage in a society's legal development to have clear legal rules, the approach taken by Savigny to
the law of possession may well be the best approach to take-from
an economic standpoint, as my discussion of the costs and benefits
of rules versus standards has been intended to suggest.
Savigny provided a clear definition of possession and used it to
deduce a host of specific rules. The structure is to some extent arbitrary, but its clarity is an enormous plus. To devise such a structure
may have been more important than trying to derive rules or standards from considerations of social policy, not only because
German law as Savigny found it was in urgent need of systematiza"The German-speaking lands were an extraordinary legal patchwork." Whitman,
supra note 2, at 102.
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tion 9 but also because German disunity created a political need
that Roman law could fulfill. That law provided a lingua franca
that because of its ethnic and temporal remoteness was politically
neutral compared to a system of law avowedly based on current social needs, needs that would differ across German states and
inevitably be inflected politically. Consistent with Max Weber's belief that the law must attain "formal rationality" in order to provide
the clear, definite, and politically neutral framework required for
economic progress, Roman law may well have played a role in the
rise of commercial society in Europe6--a role in which Savigny
cast it. The individualistic and (as I suggested earlier) "anti-feudal"
bias of Roman law made a return to it, paradoxically, an important
measure of modernization.
The challenge that eluded Savigny, as it has eluded all legal
thinkers, is to design a system of law that would achieve formal rationality in two distinct senses, each of which, however, might well
be thought inherent in the concept: a system that would be coherent and would also consist of clear rules. Clear rules, as Savigny's
own practice suggests, rarely achieve system-wide coherence; such
coherence is generally possible only at a level of abstraction too
high to generate specific rules.1
Savigny was also prescient in recognizing the importance of the
universities as a force for intellectual unity in the face of Germany's political disunity. Drawing their students from all over
Germany and focusing the research and teaching of their law faculties on the same body of legal principles, namely the Roman,
universities became a substitute for a uniform judicial system.
Holmes faced a different situation from Savigny. The legal system of post-Civil War America was mature, sure-footed, and
thoroughly professionalized. The nation was united after the
trauma of the Civil War, and although it remained a federal system
and the states retained a good deal of autonomy in matters of law,
59The jumble in which he found that law is typified by the work of the influential
eighteenth-century jurist Moser. See Mack Walker, Johann Jakob Moser and the
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation 130-35 (1981).
60See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making

of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 Yale L.J. 1841 (1996).
61See Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism (Stanford Law School, Sept. 6, 1999,
unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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especially property law, there was a considerable homogeneity of
approach. The American legal system (and one could rightly speak
of the American legal system despite the laws of the different
states) had the suppleness and the public confidence to be able to
adapt legal principles to current social needs without undue danger
of sacrificing legitimacy or creating debilitating legal uncertainty.
In that setting, the formalism of Savigny and his followers was felt
as constraining rather than liberating.
But while Holmes was enthusiastic about throwing off the fetters
of the past and making law serve current social needs, he was not
able to specify those needs. The Common Law tends to treat them
as inscrutable, arbitrary preferences, or even instincts. Holmes says
at one point, characteristically, that "[i]t is quite enough.., for the
law, that man, by an instinct which he shares with the domestic
dog,... will not allow himself to be dispossessed, either by force or
fraud, of what he holds, without trying to get it back again."'6 This
tells us, perhaps, why there are possessory rights, but not their contours. (Recall how he merely set out the three rules for obtaining
possessory rights in whales, without indicating which was best or
how economics can differentiate among the rules.) The limning of
those contours, the filling in of the picture, had to walt another
century, when the tools of economics would attain the level of refinement required for dealing illuminatingly with the law of
possession.

"Holmes, supra note 12, at 213 (footnote omitted).
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